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Klatsky Endowed Lecture in 
Human Rights* 
Catherine Marchi-Uhel◊ 
Dear Dean Scharf, Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear Colleagues, 
I am very honoured to accept the Frederick Cox Award for 
Advancing Global Justice, and to be here with you today to deliver 
the Klatsky Endowed Human Rights Lecture.  
Today, no situation can highlight the need and urgency to 
advance global justice more than the situation in Syria. Since the 
beginning of the crisis, countless reports of atrocities committed on all 
sides have been brought to the attention of the international 
community, involving widespread violations of human rights and 
 
* This article is adapted from the author’s speech at the Klatsky Endowed 
Lecture in Human Rights, presented by the Head of the United Nations 
International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the 
Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most 
Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab 
Republic since March 2011. 
◊. Catherine Marchi-Uhel, was appointed to head of the United Nations 
International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism for Syria (IIIM) on 
3 July 2017. Marchi-Uhel is a former French judge with broad 
international experience trying and adjudicating war crimes. During her 
27-year career, Marchi-Uhel has provided legal support to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the UN 
Mission in Liberia, and the UN Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo. She has also adjudicated for the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia and served as Ombudsperson to the UN Security 
Council’s Sanctions Committee. Before, that, she has served as Head of 
Chambers at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Ms. Marchi-Uhel previously served as a full-time 
international judge at the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and was a Senior Legal 
Officer with the ICTY Appeals Chamber. From July 2014 to April 2015, 
Ms. Marchi-Uhel was seconded to the United Nations Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL) as Principal Rule of Law Officer, advising the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General and the Deputy Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Rule of Law on justice and 
security matters. Ms. Marchi-Uhel became a member of the French 
judiciary in 1989 and served as juge du siège at the Tribunal de Grande 
Instance de Coutances, being specially in charge of cases involving 
juveniles. She was later seconded to the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Legal Affairs Division, Human Rights Section before joining the 
United Nations. Ms. Marchi-Uhel studied law at the Université Paris I 
— Panthéon Sorbonne and at the Université de Caen Basse-Normandie. 
She was an auditeur de justice at the Ecole Nationale de la 
Magistrature. 
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international humanitarian law.1 Depending on the circumstances, 
these allegations may amount to core international crimes. They 
involve torture; enforced disappearance; extrajudicial killings; sexual 
violence against females and males, including sexual slavery; and 
attacks against civilians and civilian objects, including schools, 
medical facilities and personnel; and the use of chemical weapons.2  
The horrors suffered by the Syrian people over the past seven 
years defy description, and so far, the affected communities have 
been, understandably, disillusioned by the prospects of seeing justice.3  
Since the outbreak of violence in 2011, the Security Council has 
failed to refer the situation in Syria to the International Criminal 
Court or to create an ad hoc tribunal.4 It is against this background 
that, in December 2016, the General Assembly established the 
International, Impartial, and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the 
Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most 
Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian 
Arab Republic since March 2011.5 I will refer to it as “the 
Mechanism.”  
The long title already reveals key aspects of the Mechanism’s 
mandate. This body is innovative in many ways and differs 
significantly from previous accountability initiatives established by 
the United Nations, such as, for instance, the ad hoc tribunals for the 
Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, although it significantly builds 
on their experiences.6 
As you know, the Mechanism is not a prosecutor’s office nor a 
court. It cannot issue indictments, prosecute cases, or render 
 
1. See generally U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Report of the independent 
international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/27/60 (Aug. 13, 2014) (compiling numerous reports on the 
human rights violations committed by the Syrian government). 
2. Id. 
3. Anne Barnard, Ben Hubbard, & Ian Fisher, As Atrocities Mount in 
Syria, Justice Seems Out of Reach, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/world/middleeast/syria-bashar-
al-assad-evidence.html [https://perma.cc/W63C-JTXE]. 
4. Mark Kerston, Calls for Prosecuting War Crimes in Syria are Growing. 
Is International Justice Possible?, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/ 
10/14/calls-for-prosecuting-war-crimes-in-syria-are-growing-is-
international-justice-possible/ [https://perma.cc/4KFY-DGGW]. 
5. G.A. Res. 71/248 (Dec. 19, 2016) [hereinafter The Mechanism]. 
6. See generally Paul R. Williams, Lisa K. Dicker & C. Danae Patterson, 
The Peace vs. Justice Puzzle and the Syrian Crisis, 24 ILSA J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 2 (2018) (outlining how war crimes have been handled in the 
past through the use of tribunals, investigations, and other 
mechanisms). 
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judgments.7 Instead, it is mandated to collect, consolidate, preserve 
and analyse evidence of violations collected by a variety of actors over 
the past 7 years, including UN bodies, Syrian and international 
NGOs, individuals, and States.8  
It is further mandated to prepare files to facilitate and expedite 
fair and independent criminal proceedings, in accordance with 
international law standards, in national, regional or international 
courts or tribunals that have, or may in the future have, jurisdiction 
over these crimes.9 
Currently, this includes national courts that can exercise 
jurisdiction, such as forms of universal jurisdiction, over certain 
crimes committed in Syria.10 However, in the future, these crimes 
could also be prosecuted at the international level, either by the ICC, 
or by a new ad hoc tribunal for Syria, or even by a regional court.11 It 
is also hoped that, in the future, Syrian courts themselves will be able 
to take their part in this process.   
In other words, the Mechanism has been mandated to conduct the 
essential preparatory work grounded in criminal law methodologies 
that will be needed for accountability processes, regardless of which 
judicial avenues may emerge in the future.12  
I believe that the creation of the Mechanism is an important 
demonstration of the international community’s will to ensure that 
crimes committed in Syria do not go unpunished. Its innovative 
mandate, that recognizes the value of creating synergies between 
international human rights fact-finding and criminal justice processes,  
 
7. Beti Hohler & Elizabeth Pederson, The Syria Mechanism: Bridge to 
Prosecutions or Evidentiary Limbo?, E-INT’L REL. (May 26, 2017), 
https://www.e-ir.info/2017/05/26/the-syria-mechanism-bridge-to-
prosecutions-or-evidentiary-limbo/ [https://perma.cc/V5Q8-DAPS]. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Id.; see Stephanie Nebehay, War Crimes Evidence in Syria 
‘Overwhelming’, Not All Can be Pursued: U.N., THOMPSON REUTERS 
(Mar. 26, 2018, 1:54 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-
crisis-syria-warcrimes/war-crimes-evidence-in-syria-overwhelming-not-
all-can-be-pursued-u-n-idUSKBN1H22GN [https://perma.cc/8UCY-
E7RT]. 
11. See Brian Stauffer, “These Are The Crimes We Are Fleeing”: Justice 
for Syria in Swedish and German Courts, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 3, 
2017), https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/03/these-are-crimes-we-
are-fleeing/justice-syria-swedish-and-german-courts 
[https://perma.cc/2GJZ-QKLJ] (noting that Syria is not now subject to 
the ICC and the challenges associated with prosecution of Syrian war 
crimes). 
12. See The Mechanism, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 1-6 (outlining the duties under 
the Mechanism that support this groundwork preparation). 
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constitutes a crucial step forward towards ensuring accountability for 
these crimes.  
In carrying out its functions, the Mechanism is guided by the 
fundamental principles of independence and impartiality.13 With 
regard to independence, this means that the Mechanism does not act 
on instructions from any entity in performing its work,14 nor is it 
influenced by the agendas of external actors.15 Regarding the material 
it collects from various sources, the Mechanism will not import the 
conclusions drawn by other bodies.16 Instead, in all instances, it will 
make its own objective assessment of material received and draw its 
own inferences, applying a criminal law standard.17 In terms of 
impartiality, the Mechanism will not apply any bias against, or in 
favour of, any particular State, group or individual.18 Instead, it will 
address crimes committed in Syria regardless of any affiliation of the 
alleged perpetrators.19 
In discharging its mandate, the Mechanism is confronted with 
numerous challenges, one of the main ones being the unprecedented 
volumes, fragmentation and duplication of potential evidence of 
crimes in Syria collected by individuals, NGOs and other entities.20 
This includes large amounts of images and video material.21 It is not 
by chance that the Syrian conflict has been tag-lined as the most 
recorded conflict in the world.22 This in turn presents two important 
 
13. Id. at 2. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. See U.N. Secretary-General, Implementation of the resolution 
establishing the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to 
Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
the Most Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the 
Syrian Arab Republic since March 2011 [hereinafter Implementation], U. 
N. Doc. A/71/755 (Jan. 19, 2017) (outlining the steps in investigation 
include gathering the intel and then directly reporting it without 
intervening conclusions). 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
20. Hohler, supra note 7. 
21. Head of the Mechanism Catherine Marchi-Uhel, Informal Debate on the 
International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to Assist in the 
Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for the Most 
Serious Crimes under International Law Committed in the Syrian Arab 
Republic since March 2011 [hereinafter Debates], at 2 (Apr. 18, 2018).  
22. See Armin Rosen, Erasing History: YouTube’s Deletion of Syria War 
Videos Concerns Human Rights Groups, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/40540411/erasing-history-youtubes-
deletion-of-syria-war-videos-concerns-human-rights-groups 
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challenges. The first one relates to the preservation and analysis of 
such volumes of material. To be able to do so, the Mechanism has 
acquired a state-of-the-art evidence management system, as mandated 
in its terms of reference, and has implemented effective measures 
aimed at protecting confidential materials and work-product against 
cyber-attacks.23 Data protection and information security are key 
priorities, and the Mechanism is firm in its commitment not to 
compromise the safety and security of material in its possession, 
including sensitive data of victims and witnesses.24 The second 
challenge flowing from the availability of such significant volumes of 
potentially relevant data relates to duplication, for instance when 
multiple entities are in possession of similar or identical material that 
eventually makes its way into the Mechanism’s collection.25 
Evidentiary challenges can also arise from collection techniques 
inconsistent with criminal law standards.26 In this respect, the 
Mechanism’s IT systems provide a framework for meticulously 
organizing the material, ensuring that it is easily searchable and that 
appropriate metadata are established, integrated and maintained to 
facilitate analysis and corroboration of existing material.27 Methods 
for tracking duplicate material, linking translations and rigorously 
enforcing confidentiality restrictions, including using cutting-edge 
technology, are also being integrated.28 
Another key challenge for the Mechanism is ensuring sustained 
funding. In creating the Mechanism, the General Assembly decided 
that it would be funded by voluntary contributions.29 However, as you 
know, voluntary funding is not appropriate for international justice 
mechanisms. This was recognised by the General Assembly when, in 
December 2017, it called upon the Secretary General of the United 
Nations to include the necessary funding for the Mechanism in his 
 
[https://perma.cc/HP42-2S5G] (“You have more hours of footage of the 
Syrian civil war on YouTube [than] there actually are hours of the war 
in real life.”). 
23. Debates, supra note 21, at 2. 
24. Id. 
25. Hohler, supra note 7. 
26. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the International, Impartial and 
Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution 
of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes Under International 
Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic Since March 2011, 
[hereinafter Report] ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/72/762 (Feb. 28, 2018).  
27. Id. at ¶ 35. 
28. Id. 
29. Implementation, supra note 16, at ¶ 51. 
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next budget proposal.30 My team and I are currently preparing our 
budget submission and I am optimistic that the Mechanism will shift 
to regular budget funding by 2020. Securing regular budget funding 
for the Mechanism would be a significant step forward and it would 
demonstrate the international community’s genuine commitment to 
justice for the victims of crimes in Syria.   
Turning to current priorities, the Mechanism is committed to 
turning its Evidence Collection into a comprehensive central 
repository of evidence concerning crimes in Syria that can be used as 
a resource to facilitate accountability. This is possible given the 
Mechanism’s broad mandate; and its dedicated focus and capacity to 
access material from a wide range of sources. In line with this 
objective, the Mechanism is progressing in its efforts to collect 
information and evidence from a variety of sources, including UN 
entities, civil society, States and other actors.31  
With regard to UN entities, the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (The 
Commission) is a privileged interlocutor for the Mechanism.32 The 
Commission was established by the Human Rights Council on 22 
August 2011 to investigate alleged violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law since March 2011.33 By the time 
the Mechanism was established, the Commission had already been 
working on documenting crimes in Syria for over five years, producing 
several public reports and presenting its findings to the Human Rights 
Council.34 The material collected by the Commission is of great 
relevance to the Mechanism’s work, although significant differences 
exist between the two bodies, which have distinct and complementary 
mandates.35 The Commission focuses on directly collecting 
 
30. G.A. Res. 72/191, ¶ 35 (Jan. 23, 2018). 
31. Debates, supra note 21, at 2. 
32. See Report, supra note 26, at ¶ 12 (defining The Commission’s role 
within the Mechanism). 
33. U.N. Hum. Rts. Council [UNHRC] Resolution Adopted by the Human 
Rights Council at its Seventeenth Special Session [hereinafter UNHRC] 
S-17/1 (Aug. 22, 2011). 
34. See Report, supra note 26 (stating that resolution 71/248 establishing 
the Mechanism was adopted on 21 December 2016); see also UNHRC, 
supra note 33 (stating that the Commission established on 22 August 
2011). 
35. Compare The Mechanism, supra note 5, at ¶ 1 (stating that the 
Mechanism’s purpose is to assist in the investigation and prosecution of 
persons responsible for the most serious crimes under international law 
and to collect and analyze information and evidence of such crimes), 
with UNHRC, supra note 33, at ¶ 13 (stating that the Commission’s 
purpose is to investigate all violations of international human rights law 
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information, publicly reporting broad patterns of human rights and 
international humanitarian law violations, and making 
recommendations, in particular, to Member States.36 In contrast, the 
Mechanism focuses on the most serious crimes, and is required to 
maintain the confidentiality of its substantive work.37 Other notable 
differences between the two bodies include the standard of proof. The 
Commission of Inquiry adopts the “reasonable grounds to believe” 
standard to attribute responsibility to a certain party,38 while the 
Mechanism focuses on individual criminal responsibility and is guided 
by criminal law methodologies and standards.39  
The resolution creating the Mechanism contains an express 
reference to the work of the Commission, and access to its holdings is 
a central requirement in the Mechanism’s mandate.40 Indeed, this has 
been a priority from the very start of its work. In March, a 
memorandum of understanding was signed between the two entities, 
allowing for an important part of the Commission’s material to be 
shared with the Mechanism.41 
In addition to the Commission of Inquiry on Syria, the 
Mechanism is engaging with other United Nations entities and 
identifying concrete opportunities for coordination and cooperation 
including, where possible, access to relevant material in their 
possession.42 
The Mechanism is also engaging extensively with civil society, in 
particular Syrian NGOs, whose important role in documenting crimes 
the Mechanism has recognised since the very start.43 Since violent 
unrest erupted in March 2011, and as the country descended into 
armed conflict, numerous individuals and organisations have been 
relentlessly documenting violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law, some of which may amount to international crimes, 
 
and to collect all facts and circumstances that may amount to such 
violations).  
36. UNHRC, supra note 33, at ¶ 13.  
37. See generally Report, supra note 26 (establishing the Mechanism’s focus 
on the most serious crimes and intent to maintain confidentiality). 
38. UNHRC, Report of the Independent International Commission of 
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic [hereinafter UNHRC Report] 
A/HRC/39/65, at ¶ 3 (Aug. 9, 2018). 
39. Implementation, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 13, 15, 19, 23.  
40. The Mechanism, supra note 5, at ¶ 1.  
41. G.A. Res. 37/L.38, ¶ 47 (Mar. 19, 2018). 
42. Implementation, supra note 16, at ¶ 12. 
43. Id. at ¶ 5. 
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often at great risk to their own lives.44 The material they have 
gathered is an integral part of what the Mechanism seeks access to, 
with a view to implementing its mandate. To this end, the 
Mechanism has developed and distributed numerous contributor 
surveys to elicit information from upstream collectors regarding the 
type, quantity, format and content of relevant material held by 
them.45 The results of the surveys are being collated to give the 
Mechanism an overview of the material in question and to prioritize 
collection efforts.  
The Mechanism is also committed to ensuring two-way 
communication with civil society, in particular Syrian NGOs, and to 
ensuring that the voices of victims are heard and appropriately 
factored into its work.46 To this end, it is engaging in an ongoing 
dialogue both one-to-one as well as in group settings.47 On 3 April in 
Lausanne, the Mechanism and 28 Syrian NGOs signed a protocol of 
collaboration outlining a set of overarching principles to guide mutual 
engagement.48 The Protocol aims to promote mutual understanding 
regarding opportunities for collaboration, in furtherance of the parties’ 
common goal of ensuring accountability for the crimes committed in 
the Syrian Arab Republic.49 The principles outlined in the protocol 
provide a general framework for cooperation that can extend to other 
NGOs willing to collaborate with the Mechanism in the future. 
The Mechanism is also continuing its engagement with States, 
many of which are willing to provide it with relevant information and 
evidence in their possession.50 Several States have already revised, or 
 
44. Id. at ¶ 5; International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism, 
Protocol of Cooperation Between the International, Independent and 
Impartial Mechanism and Syrian Civil Society Organizations 
Participating in the Lausanne Platform [hereinafter Lausanne Protocol], 
at 1, available at https://iiim.un.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/Protocol_IIIM_-_Syrian_NGOs_English.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/8YYX-ATVE]. 
45. Debates, supra note 21, at 2. 
46. Lausanne Protocol, supra note 44, at 2. 
47. See generally id. at 2, 4 (allowing Syrian NGOs and organizations to 
openly communicate with the Mechanism and ensure continuous 
dialogue).  
48. Id. at 1. 
49. Id. 
50. Implementation, supra note 16; Press Release, European Commission, 
The European Union steps up its support for investigations into war 
crimes and accountability in Syria (Jul. 19, 2017), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-2069_en.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8JJX-ZP5X].  
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are in the process of revising, their national laws and procedures to 
allow full engagement with the Mechanism.51  
Moving on to another priority, the Mechanism has identified the 
need for a Structural Investigation to ensure a broad, contextual 
understanding of the Syrian situation.52 The Structural Investigation 
seeks to map crime patterns, examine the contextual elements 
required to establish core crimes, and apprehend the cultural, 
historical, and gender dimension of crimes,  as well as the structures 
of power and links between crimes and individuals, ranging from 
direct physical perpetrators to other perpetrators wielding power and 
authority over the events.53  
The Structural Investigation also provides a crucial framework for 
another of the Mechanism’s key priorities, namely the building of case 
files.54 Indeed, the volume of allegations and the number of potential 
perpetrators make it impossible for the Mechanism to address all 
crimes committed in Syria since March 2011.55 The Structural 
Investigation provides a principled foundation for the Mechanism to 
exercise discretion, in an independent and impartial manner, about 
which cases to build.56 It also promotes consistency of approach across 
the Mechanism’s case files, given that the key factual questions 
addressed in the context of the Structural Investigation potentially 
constitute cross-cutting material facts in the case files.57 These 
 
51. Debates, supra note 21, at 3. 
52. U.N. Office at Geneva, Press Conference by Catherine Marchi-Uhel, 
Head of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism to 
Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
the Most Serious Crimes Under International Law Committed in the 
Syrian Arab Republic Since March 2011 [hereinafter Press Conference], 
(Sept. 20, 2018) available at 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear_en)/BF
0B4A22311CE715C125830F00552D8A?OpenDocument 
[https://perma.cc/A328-5CR6]. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. See Nousha Kabawat & Fernando Travesi, Justice for Syrian Victims 
Beyond Trials: The Need for New, Innovative Uses for Documentation 
of Human Rights Violations in Syria, INT’L CEN. FOR TRANSITIONAL 
JUST. [ICTJ], at 1 (Feb. 2018), 
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Briefing-
Syria_Documentation-2018.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q6E8-DMX8] 
(explaining that the Syrian was is the most documented conflict in 
history and that information and stories have piled up, remaining 
unused in databases and files). 
56. Press Conference, supra note 52. 
57. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the International, Impartial and 
Independent Mechanism to Assist in the Investigation and Prosecution 
of Persons Responsible for the Most Serious Crimes Under International 
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include, for example, the existence and nature of armed conflicts and 
of widespread or systematic attacks – for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity charges, respectively; as well as command structures 
and joint action resulting in the commission of crimes – for theories of 
individual responsibility such as superior responsibility and co-
perpetration.58 
When it comes to selection of specific case files, the Mechanism is 
guided by the principles outlined in its First Report to the General 
Assembly.59 Based on the results of the Structural Investigation, case 
selection will reflect a range of factors, including the gravity of crimes; 
the level and type of alleged perpetrator; crime categories emblematic 
of the events in the Syrian Arab Republic; a fair representation of 
crimes committed against victims on all sides of the events; a fair 
representation of harms experienced by men, women, girls and boys; 
crime categories and culpable acts or omissions that sustain the 
ongoing commission of crimes; and complementarity with case files 
developed by other actors, including national authorities and civil 
society.60  
Finally, a key priority for the Mechanism is supporting national 
jurisdictions’ efforts to investigate and prosecute crimes committed in 
Syria.61 To this end, the Mechanism is continuing its proactive 
engagement with national war crimes units in various States, both 
directly as well as in the context of relevant fora, such as the EU 
Genocide Network hosted by Eurojust in The Hague.62 Consultations 
held so far have identified areas where the Mechanism can be of 
assistance to overcome some of the major challenges that national 
prosecutors face, including limited resources, lack of access to the 
territory, and the constraints deriving from their own system’s 
procedural rules.63 In this sense, the Mechanism’s unique status offers 
many advantages. First, the Mechanism can rely on a substantial 
analytical capacity, including an important Arabic-speaking 
component. Second, the mandate from the General Assembly places 
the Mechanism in a privileged position to access and analyse material 
held by others, which allows it to benefit from the collection and 
centralisation of considerable amounts of potential evidence. 
 
Law Committed in the Syrian Arab Republic Since March 2011, 
[hereinafter Report II] ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. A/73/295 (Aug. 3, 2018). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at ¶ 19. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at ¶ 20. 
62. Id. at ¶ 36. 
63. Id. 
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Furthermore, the Mechanism can rely on a flexible procedure, not 
bound by specific rules as is the case for national jurisdictions. 
To date, the Mechanism has received and is currently processing 
several requests for information and evidence addressed to it by 
national war crimes units.64 These requests for assistance are also 
informing the Mechanism collection effort and where possible, priority 
is being given to the collection of material most likely to assist 
ongoing national criminal justice processes. 
While its mandate is firmly centered on supporting criminal 
prosecutions, the Mechanism also recognizes that criminal 
accountability is a component of a broader transitional justice 
process. The information collected by the Mechanism, for example, 
may be of relevance not only in the context of criminal proceedings, 
but also in the context of other transitional justice objectives.65 These 
include, for instance, the search for missing persons as well as vetting 
and reparations processes. Although the Mechanism’s mandate does 
not explicitly contemplate contribution to other forms of transitional 
justice, the experience of international tribunals set up by the 
Security Council, for instance, has revealed how overtime, legacy 
going beyond classic forms of justice has become an important part of 
their contribution.66 With those objectives in mind, the Mechanism 
understands its scope for maximizing the utility of its evidence 
collection for broader transitional justice purposes and is open to 
possible developments in this regard. 
I would like to spend a few words on the meaning of justice and 
on the significance of the Mechanism’s work for those most affected 
by the crimes in Syria. I believe that justice has no meaning unless 
accountability efforts are not driven by the demands of victims. This 
is why, in performing this crucial preparatory work, the Mechanism is 
guided by a victim-centred approach, aimed at strengthening the 
confidence of the affected Syrian communities in the prospect of 
justice and promoting the dignity of the victims.67 The Mechanism is 
further committed to promoting outreach and effective exchanges 
with affected communities, as well as hearing the views and interests 
of victims and making sure that these are canvassed and considered 
on an ongoing basis.68  
The Mechanism is mindful of the risk of marginalizing the 
experiences of certain categories of victims in international justice 
processes—I am thinking in particular of victims of sexual and 
 
64. Id. at ¶ 21. 
65. Id. at ¶ 48. 
66. Id. 
67. Report, supra note 26, at ¶ 4. 
68. Id. at ¶ 22. 
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gender-based violence. It is not by chance that special emphasis is 
placed on these crimes in the Mechanism’s terms of reference.69 
Important lessons in this regard have been learned from the 
experience of the international tribunals over the past 25 years, and I 
see a real opportunity for the Mechanism to build on this 
accumulated best practice. For instance, since the early days of its 
work, due consideration has been given to the appointment of experts 
in sexual and gender-based violence.70 The Mechanism is further 
committed to addressing the full range of sexual violence and gender-
based crimes arising in the Syrian context, making sure that they 
form part of our core work to support accountability for these crimes 
and ensuring that the voices of women are properly heard in the 
accountability process. 
Let me conclude with a short reflection on the theme of the award 
I am so honoured to receive today: advancing global justice. 
In establishing the Mechanism, the first body of this kind ever 
established, and in calling upon all States, all parties to the conflict as 
well as civil society to cooperate fully with it, the General Assembly 
has taken an initiative that I view as a historic step towards 
accountability. The Mechanism’s creation sends a signal that 
impunity for those responsible for the most heinous crimes committed 
in Syria is not acceptable. It also signals that the pursuit of 
accountability no longer requires a choice between national and 
international (or hybrid) jurisdictions. On the contrary, the 
Mechanism can be seen as a model integrating different jurisdictional 
avenues at the national, regional or international level. It also 
constitutes a model for bridging the gap between human rights fact-
finding and criminal prosecutions through proactive cooperation 
between investigative and prosecutorial authorities, UN entities, and 
civil society.  
I am mindful of the disillusionment of people most affected by the 
crimes, who have no immediate prospects of justice. The Mechanism, 
which was established against a background of daunting allegations of 
international crimes and flagrant impunity, is globally raising 
important hopes and expectations, not least on the part of Syrian 
victims and the civilian population at large.  
We have to be realistic; lots of work and time is going to be 
required before the Mechanism is in a position to complete and share 
full-fledged files. In addition, today, we cannot anticipate whether and 
when an international court or tribunal may in the future have 
jurisdiction over crimes committed in Syria.  
However, several criminal proceedings relating to Syria have been 
initiated in various countries. In relation to these cases, the 
 
69. Implementation, supra note 16, at annex. ¶¶ 19-21. 
70. Report, supra note 26, at ¶ 31. 
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Mechanism can play an immediate, significant role in supporting on-
going and future investigation of crimes committed in Syria by 
national prosecutors. 
I believe that the Mechanism has the potential to contribute 
meaningfully to ensuring accountability and providing redress for 
victims, by assisting national jurisdictions and at the same time 
paving the way for future prosecutions at the international level. 
I am inspired by the dignity and draw strength from the courage 
of the Syrian people as I carry out the important task that has been 
entrusted to me as Head of the Mechanism.  
I thank you for your attention and look forward to further 
discussing with you. 
 
